HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS		QUICK SEARCH:   [advanced] Author: Keyword(s): Year:  Vol:  Page:

This Article Full Text Full Text (PDF) Submit a response View Shopping Cart Alert me when this article is cited Alert me when eLetters are posted Alert me if a correction is posted Services Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in PubMed Alert me to new issues of the journal Download to citation manager Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Malone, R. E. Search for Related Content PubMed PubMed Citation Articles by Malone, R. E. Related Collections Ethics Health Promotion Other Tobacco Tobacco Control

Ruth E. Malone, RN, PhD

The author is with the Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, School of Nursing, and Institute for Health Policy Studies, University of California, San Francisco.

Correspondence: Requests for reprints should be sent to Ruth E. Malone, RN, PhD, Institute for Health Policy Studies, Box 0936, Laurel Heights Campus, University of California, San Francisco, CA 94143-0936 (e-mail: rmalone{at}itsa.ucsf.edu).

Objectives. The goal of this study was to describe how the tobacco industry collects information about public health groups.

Methods. Publicly available internal tobacco industry documents were reviewed and analyzed using a chronological case study approach.

Results. The industry engaged in aggressive intelligence gathering, used intermediaries to obtain materials under false pretenses, sent public relations spies to the organizations' meetings, and covertly taped strategy sessions. Other industry strategies included publicly minimizing the effects of boycotts, painting health advocates as "extreme," identifying and exploiting disagreements, and planning to "redirect the funding" of tobacco control organizations to other purposes.

Conclusions. Public health advocates often make light of tobacco industry observers, but industry surveillance may be real, intense, and covert and may obstruct public health initiatives.

This article has been cited by other articles:

				D. M. Cook and L. A. Bero The Politics of Smoking in Federal Buildings: An Executive Order Case Study Am J Public Health, September 1, 2009; 99(9): 1588 - 1595. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

				P A McDaniel, E A Smith, and R E Malone Philip Morris's Project Sunrise: weakening tobacco control by working with it Tob. Control, June 1, 2006; 15(3): 215 - 223. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

				N Offen, E A Smith, and R E Malone The perimetric boycott: a tool for tobacco control advocacy Tob. Control, August 1, 2005; 14(4): 272 - 277. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

				A B Gilmore and M McKee Moving East: how the transnational tobacco industry gained entry to the emerging markets of the former Soviet Union--part II: an overview of priorities and tactics used to establish a manufacturing presence Tob. Control, June 1, 2004; 13(2): 151 - 160. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

				J. White and L. A. Bero Public Health Under Attack: The American Stop Smoking Intervention Study (ASSIST) and the Tobacco Industry Am J Public Health, February 1, 2004; 94(2): 240 - 250. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

				E A Smith and R E Malone Thinking the "unthinkable": why Philip Morris considered quitting Tob. Control, June 1, 2003; 12(2): 208 - 213. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]