© 2005 American Public Health Association DOI: 10.2105/AJPH.2004.044727
The author is with the Department of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning at Tufts University. Correspondence: Request for reprints should be sent to Sheldon Krimsky, PhD, Department of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155 (e-mail: sheldon.krimsky{at}tufts.edu).
The term "weight of evidence" (WOE) appears in regulatory rules and decisions. However, there has been little discussion about the meaning, variations of use, and epistemic significance of WOE for setting health and safety standards. This article gives an overview of the role of WOE in regulatory science, discusses alternative views about the methodology underlying the concept, and places WOE in the context of the Supreme Courts decision in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc (1993). I argue that whereas the WOE approach to evaluating scientific evidence is gaining favor among regulators, its applications in judicial processes may be in conflict with some interpretations of how the Daubert criteria for judging reliable evidence should be applied. This article has been cited by other articles:
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