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This Article Full Text Full Text (PDF) All Versions of this Article: AJPH.2008.143131v1 99/7/1188    most recent Submit a response View Shopping Cart Alert me when this article is cited Alert me when eLetters are posted Alert me if a correction is posted Services Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in PubMed Alert me to new issues of the journal Download to citation manager Google Scholar Articles by Campbell, R. B. Articles by Balbach, E. D. PubMed PubMed Citation Articles by Campbell, R. B. Articles by Balbach, E. D. Related Collections Health Policy Public Health Practice Other Tobacco Tobacco Control

Richard B. Campbell, ScD and Edith D. Balbach, PhD

Richard B. Campbell and Edith D. Balbach are with the Community Health Program, Tufts University, Medford, MA.

Correspondence: Requests for reprints should be sent to Richard B. Campbell, Community Health Program, Tufts University, 112 Packard Ave, Medford MA 02155 (e-mail: richard.campbell{at}tufts.edu).

The tobacco industry often utilizes third parties to advance its policy agenda. One such utilization occurred when the industry identified organized labor and progressive groups as potential allies whose advocacy could undermine public support for excise tax increases. To attract such collaboration, the industry framed the issue as one of tax fairness, creating a labor management committee to provide distance from tobacco companies and furthering progressive allies' interests through financial and logistical support. Internal industry documents indicate that this strategic use of ideas, institutions, and interests facilitated the recruitment of leading progressive organizations as allies. By placing excise taxes within a strategic policy nexus that promotes mutual public interest goals, public health advocates may use a similar strategy in forging their own excise tax coalitions.