© 2002 American Public Health Association
Derek Yach is with the World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. Stella Aguinaga Bialous is a public health policy consultant in San Francisco, Calif. Correspondence: Requests for reprints should be sent to Derek Yach, MBChB, MPH, Executive Director, Noncommunicable Diseases and Mental Health, World Health Organization, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland (e-mail: yachd{at}who.int). Our commentary is based on facts supported by the evidence cited, not on "innuendo and guilt by association" or "ad hominem attack." The individuals and organizations mentioned are merely representative of the web of front groups and alliances created by the tobacco industry in its continuing attempts to dismiss the overwhelming scientific evidence linking secondhand smoke with death and disease. ILSI's current membership roster lists Kraft Foods Inc, a division of Philip Morris Companies Inc, and Japan Tobacco Food Division. Past links, both direct and indirect, exist between ILSI and the tobacco companies and their affiliates. Tobacco companies often use their food subsidiaries to gain access and leverage in areas that are essential to the cigarette business. Several of ILSI's activities, such as those involved with pesticide residues, risk assessment, and toxicology, have a bearing on tobacco companies' business interests. With ILSI's knowledge, and sometimes through ILSI's initiative, the tobacco industry participated in some of these activities directly and through membership in committees or indirectly, through its food businesses, in what appears to have been a mutually beneficial exchange (see, for example, Shatenstein,1 Malaspina,2 Borelli,3 and ILSI4; complete reference list available on request). The World Health Organization (WHO) has implemented strict conflict-of-interest policies and requires full disclosure of financial links for all collaborative and contractual work. ILSI has been formally informed by WHO of these policies. WHO requires that ILSI respect a basic requirement in relation to real and perceived conflicts of interest: to have a firewall between commercial interests (of which ILSI has many, particularly with respect to food interests) and WHO's normative and guideline-setting roles. This requirement has recently led WHO to circumscribe how it will interact with ILSI in relation to food, nutrition, and other areas. (Since publication of the original article, WHO has discussed with ILSI issues related to perceived conflict of interest and believes that ILSI has taken positive steps to address the concerns raised.) We were surprised by the Journal's decision to publish a letter from the president of FORCES Canada. Although we acknowledge that our reference 40 was incorrect (it should have been http://www.junkscience.com/feb01/perske.htm), the letter has no scientific merit. Letters to the editor are a well-known tobacco industry strategy to disseminate misinformation in the peer-reviewed, indexed literature.5 As stated in a Philip Morris strategic plan, "[C]ommunicating with and mobilizing smokers is a key element in achieving our sociopolitical objectives."6 The creation and support of smokers' rights groups is yet another well-known tobacco industry strategy to promote its political and public relations agenda.7,8 FORCES claims to be a smokers' rights organization with no financial ties to the tobacco industry. It is possible that it chooses to convey the tobacco industry's propaganda for free. However, FORCES uses, in its anti-health campaign, arguments and studies created and funded by the tobacco companies, listing these "studies" and "researchers" as independent when they are neither independent nor, often, bona fide academic researchers.9,10 In addition, FORCES lists tobacco industrysupported smokers' groups, such as the American Smokers' Alliance, among its past and current affiliates.11,12 Recently, FORCES merged with Californians for Smokers' Rights, sharing a post office box and an Internet address.13,14 Californians for Smokers' Rights is a group with long-standing and well-known links to the tobacco industry.15,16 The tobacco industry is hardly the only interest group to attack science-based policymaking to protect its profits.17 However, this industry has a long history of using these tactics at the cost of public health. With respect to passive smoking, this is not a matter of a healthy, honest, science-based disagreement. Rather, it is a continuation of a tobacco industry campaign of deception. References 1. Shatenstein S. ILSI and the tobacco industry connection. Addiction.2001;96:15091510.[Medline] 2. Malaspina A, President, International Life Sciences InstituteNutrition Foundation, to Borelli TJ, Manager, Scientific Affairs, Philip Morris. April 20, 1989. Document no. 2021595961. Available at: http://www.pmdocs.com. Accessed March 20, 2001. 3. Borelli T to Winokur M. Subject: independent research institutes. May 2, 1989. Document no. 2021595960. Available at: http://www.pmdocs.com. Accessed January 6, 2002. 4. International Life Sciences Institute. Meeting of the ILSI Environmental Sciences Group, April 5, 1989. Minutes. Document no. 2021595963/5992. Available at: http://www.pmdocs.com. Accessed April 17, 2001.
5.
Rennie D. Smoke and letters. JAMA.1993;270:17421743. 6. Philip Morris. USA five year plan 19901994. Document no. 2048979969/0093. Available at: http://www.pmdocs.com. Accessed January 5, 2002. 7. Non-Smokers' Rights Association. Tobacco industry front groups in Canada. Available at: http://www.nsra-adnf.ca/english/frontgroup.html. Accessed January 31, 2002. 8. American Nonsmokers' Rights Foundation. The National Smokers Alliance: exposed. January 1999. Available at: http://www.no-smoke.org/nsa.html. Accessed January 31, 2002. 9. Forces International. FORCES International independent researchers. Available at: http://www.forces.org/research. Accessed January 6, 2002. 10. Non-Smokers' Rights Association. The Fraser Institute: economic think tank or front for the tobacco industry? April 1999. Available at: http://www.nsra-adnf.ca/english/npublications.html (PDF file). Accessed January 31, 2002. 11. Unknown. ASA Affiliates. 1998. Document no. 2070314099. Available at: http://www.pmdocs.com. Accessed January 5, 2002. 12. Philip Morris. Budget review. 1995. Document no. 2046900709/0711. Available at: http://www.pmdocs.com. Accessed January 5, 2002. 13. Californians for Smokers Rights, FORCES International affiliate chapter. Available at: http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Senate/3649/. Accessed April 2, 2002. 14. Smokers' rights organizations. Californians for Smokers' Rights. Available at: http://www.forces.org/links/files/smokersr.htm. Accessed April 2, 2002. 15. Aguinaga S, Glantz SA. The use of public records acts to interfere with tobacco control. Tobacco Control.1995;4:222230. 16. Glantz SA, Balbach ED. Tobacco War: Inside the California Battles. Berkeley: University of California Press; 2000. Also available at: http://www.ucpress.edu/books/pages/8861.html. Accessed April 2, 2002.
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Rosenstock L, Lee LJ. Attacks on science: the risks to evidence-based policy. Am J Public Health.2002;92:1418. This article has been cited by other articles:
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