© 2003 American Public Health Association
Thomas Bodenheimer is with the Department of Family and Community Medicine, University of California at San Francisco. Correspondence: Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas Bodenheimer, MD, MPH, Bldg 80-83, San Francisco General Hospital, 1001 Potrero Ave, San Francisco CA 94110 (e-mail: tbodie{at}earthlink.net).
Before 1971, all proposals for universal health insurance were based on private sector financing and administration. After 1971, universal health insurance plans relying on the private sector complicated efforts of the universal health insurance movement. To forge as broad a movement for universal health insurance as possible, it may be worthwhile for universal health insurance advocates of different persuasions to seek common ground on the basis of a set of goals for a new health care system. The goals can serve as a measuring stick to determine which health insurance plans are worthy of support.
FROM 1912 TO 1971, THE movement for universal health insurance in the United States advocated a publicly administered system, supported by social security or taxes and drawing on concepts widely accepted in other developed nations. Three major periods of activitythe American Association for Labor Legislation efforts from 1912 to 1919, the efforts to pass the WagnerMurrayDingell bill championed by President Truman (19431949), and the KennedyGriffiths Health Security Act of 1970characterized this era. The drive for universal health insurance generally featured a united movement of reformers clashing with powerful oppositionin particular the American Medical Association and the private insurance industry. In the past 30 years, the character of the drive for universal health insurance experienced a fundamental change. Opponents of the KennedyGriffiths legislation changed their strategy. Rather than simply kill the legislation, they offered their own alternative, President Nixons proposal for an employer mandate in 1971. Under this proposal, the government would require employers to purchase private insurance for their employees. For the first time, universal health insurance was conceived as a program of the private insurance industry, with government subsidies to help people without the means to buy private insurance policies.1 As a result of this sea change in the conception of universal health insurance, the health insurance reform movement fragmented beyond recognition. In contrast to the clarity of the pre-1971 era, when proponents and opponents of publicly administered universal health insurance squared off, the complexity of the current situation poses daunting strategic problems. In 2003, almost no one overtly opposes the idea of universal health insurance, but virtually everyone disagrees with everyone else on how universal health insurance should be constructed. The American public is now faced with a bewildering array of proposalsemployer mandates, individual mandates, voluntary subsidies to employers or to individuals, tax credit plans, Medicaid expansion, Medicare expansion, and publicly administered plans, each with its academic and political supporters. The proposal that continues the pre-1971 idea of a public insurance program supported by social security or taxes is the "single-payer" plan, which I shall call the "public solution." My point of view is that the public solution is the best way to implement universal health insurance, but achieving universal health insurance will be easier if advocates of the public solution and well-intentioned supporters of solutions that contain some private or quasiprivate elements seek common ground. Most proposals that are not fully in the public realm are a mix of public and private mechanisms; in a vast oversimplification, I will call these proposals the "private solution."
Antagonism between those who advocate the public solution and adherents of the private solution is common. Bridging the chasm between the 2 may improve the prospects for universal health insurance. On the other hand, the chasm is real, based on disagreements about how health care, and society in general, should be organized. The challenge is to distinguish between irreconcilable differences and areas of potential unity. There are several categories of private-solution advocates. A first step is to separate those who oppose the public solution on the basis of political disagreement from those who privately support the public solution but publicly favor private-based plans for reasons of political feasibility. Members of the latter group are allies of public-solution proponents; rather than being attacked as sellouts, they should be approached by public-solution advocates to discuss their concerns and look for common ground.
The former groupthose who truly believe in a private solutionare not a homogeneous entity (Figure 1
On the other hand, many supporters of the private solution truly desire universal coverage but do not trust the government to do it right. Given the reality of corporate control over both political parties, it is difficult to argue with peoples suspicions of the US government. Those who favor some varieties of the private solution, because they sincerely believe in that model, may be legitimate participants in a universal health insurance movement. How might supporters of the public solution and honest advocates of the private solution find common ground? To start with, they can search for agreement on a vision for a new health care system.
The following set of principles, each addressing more than 1 of 5 intertwined goals universal access, reasonable cost, high quality, caregiver-friendliness, and equalitysuggests a vision for a new health care system. By no means is this the only formulation of goals; it is offered as an example of how people supporting a variety of specific universal health insurance plans can unite on a vision for health care.
Higher levels of agreement between proponents of the public and private solutions may be achievable through discussions that compare the vision embodied in the 5 goals with the reality of our present system.
Discussion of the vision and its gap with reality will sort out which advocates of the private solution are potential allies of public-solution supporters. For example, it is unlikely that for-profit private insurance can fit with the goal of equality because for-profit insurance segments the population into higher and lower risk "buckets," with higher-risk (i.e., older and less healthy) people paying more. On the other hand, quasi-private, nonprofit, community-rated, strictly regulated insurance mechanisms that more closely resemble insurance mechanisms in Germany and Japan may be compatible with the equality goal. This brief and incomplete presentation of the gap between vision and reality is offered as an example of how universal health insurance advocates of different stripes can use a discussion of goals, including discussion of the visionreality gap, to increase areas of agreement or sharpen topics of disagreement. Focusing on goals rather than specific universal health insurance plans could be an important unifying step. "Single-payer," for example, is not a goal; it is a means to implement the access, cost, and equality goals described above.
Focusing on goals may be a soothing and nonconfrontational activity, but eventually a specific universal health insurance plan is needed. The goals can be used as measuring sticks to determine whether or not a specific plan deserves support. But what happens to the unity generated around goals when it is time to decide on specifics? We may never achieve one specific unifying plan. Publicsolution advocates, of whom I am one, have a specific plan. Supporters of solutions with a mix of public and private elements have specific plans. Members of these 2 groups are unlikely to let go of their specific plans, but they should commit themselves to building on whatever common ground is possible. This can be done by reaching unity on a set of goals and popularizing those goals. It can be done by supporting legislative efforts that strive to enact a list of goals. For example, the Health Care Access Resolution (House Concurrent Resolution 99) proposes a series of goals and directs Congress to pass universal health insurance legislation consistent with those goals. A strategy that postpones the need to pick a specific health insurance plan is the "federalstate partnership" model, which proposes to enact universal health insurance in 2 giant steps.14,15 First would be the enactment of a federal law creating potent financial incentives for states to legislate universal health insurance based on a set of goals. Second, specific implementation of universal coverage would take place at the state level. In 2000, legislation embodying the federalstate partnership approach was introduced as the Health Security for All Americans Act by Representatives Baldwin and Obey and the late Senator Wellstone. Supporters of the public solution and the private solution can also work together on proactive strategies to make partial improvements in insurance coverage (e.g., a public program to cover prescription drugs under Medicare) and on defensive strategies to stop bad things from happening (e.g., defeating the privatization and voucherization of the Medicare program supported by Republicans and a number of Democrats). As advocates of the public and the private solutions work together on formulating a set of goals and in offensive and defensive campaigns, the discussions that take place regarding a specific universal health insurance plan will, I hope, result in a larger andafter 95 years of failuresuccessful movement for universal health insurance in the United States. Should advocates of the public solution (the single-payer movement) abandon our enthusiasm for our proposal? Absolutely not. I firmly believe that the public solution is the best solution. However, I differ from some single-payer advocates in that, although I find the public solution to be the best solution, I am not sure that it is the only solution. It may be possible to construct a publicprivate proposal that approaches the goals listed above. Am I championing the same tepid incrementalism that has failed us for the past decades? Strategy-wise, what I propose is incrementalan attempt to build a stronger voice for universal health insurance in steps. Goal-wise, it is not incrementalthe vision of a future health system must project health care as a service rather than a business, creating a new entity that lies galaxies apart from what we have now.
Peer Reviewed Accepted for publication September 10, 2002.
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