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© 2007 American Public Health Association
DOI: 10.2105/AJPH.2006.101063
GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND LAW |
Cristine D. Delnevo and Mary Hrywna are with the Department of Health Education/Behavioral Science, School of Public Health, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Piscataway.
Correspondence: Requests for reprints should be sent to Cristine D. Delnevo, UMDNJ-School of Public Health, 317 George St, Suite 209, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 (e-mail: delnevo{at}umdnj.edu).
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ABSTRACT |
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 TOP ABSTRACT INTRODUCTIONTOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENT REVIEWFINDINGSRELEVANCE TO CONTEMPORARY...References |
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Present-day consumption of little cigars rivals that of the early 1970s when sales of little cigars boomed. This boom was largely attributed to RJ Reynolds, and documents reveal how and why they became a powerful force in little cigar sales. RJ Reynolds designed a little cigar, Winchesters, for cigarette smokers and produced one as close to a cigarette as legally possible.
Initially, RJ Reynolds intended to capitalize on the cigarette advertising broadcast ban, but the price and tax structure was more critical to Winchester’s success. Today, the tobacco industry is fighting again to sustain its unique application of federal definitions for little cigars. Regulatory efforts are needed to close taxation loopholes for the little cigar.
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INTRODUCTION |
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TOPABSTRACTINTRODUCTIONTOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENT REVIEWFINDINGSRELEVANCE TO CONTEMPORARY...References |
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CIGAR SMOKING ROSE dramatically during the 1990s after decades of declining consumption. Higher levels of cigar use coincided with increased and innovative cigar marketing by the tobacco industry, the high visibility offered by many celebrities quoted and photographed with cigars, and the success of Cigar Aficionado and Smoke magazines.1–3 Cigar use is often rejected by the public as a serious health risk but even moderate cigar use poses significant dangers to health.4 The rapid rise in cigar use during the mid-1990s garnered much attention from the public health and lay community. However, some surveys suggest that the cigar boom may be over5,6 and interest in cigar use as a public health problem has waned.7 However, it would be premature to conclude that the popularity of cigars has subsided. Data from the US Department of Agriculture clearly indicate that cigar consumption continues to increase each year.8
In contrast to previous trends during the "boom," the largest growth since 1998 was not among large cigars1 but among "little cigars," which increased 170% between 1998 and 2006.8 Although little cigars differ from large ones with respect to weight, this is not the only nor, arguably, the most important distinction between them. Other characteristics of little cigars that set them apart from large ones are features common to cigarettes, such as shape, size, filters, and packaging (i.e., 20 sticks to a pack; Figure 1
).7 Present-day consumption of little cigars (more than 4 billion sticks in 2006) rivals that of the early 1970s when a loophole in the federal law (i.e., Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act) banned cigarette ads on television but allowed on-air marketing of little cigars. Sales of little cigars quadrupled between 1971 and 1973. In addition to banning cigarette advertising on television and radio, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act also required that cigarette packs display stronger health warnings. At the time, cigars did not require warning labels. The success of the little cigar in the early 1970s was overwhelmingly attributed to RJ Reynolds’s (RJR’s) little cigar "Winchester" (Figure 2), which was extensively criticized for its cigarette-like marketing.
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Policymakers and public health advocates criticized RJR’s Winchester little cigars, calling them "cigarettes in disguise," and initiated unsuccessful regulatory efforts in the early 1970s to reclassify little cigars as cigarettes. Renewed efforts are under way to address the proliferation of the cigarette-like little cigar. The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB), as a result of numerous inquiries for clarification on the regulations that pertain to these products, drafted proposed changes to the regulations to better differentiate little cigars and cigarettes.9 As such, we feel it important to revisit the past and consider in particular how and why a cigarette company emerged as a powerful force in the sales of little cigars. We analyzed internal tobacco industry documents from the early 1970s and focused on RJR’s development and marketing of the Winchester little cigar.
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TOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENT REVIEW |
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TOPABSTRACTINTRODUCTIONTOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENT REVIEWFINDINGSRELEVANCE TO CONTEMPORARY...References |
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We performed searches of the tobacco industry document archives from the University of California, San Francisco, Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu) between January and June 2006. The initial search, which yielded almost 4000 documents, focused on the product (i.e., little or small cigar) and brand name (Winchester) and was restricted to a 10-year span (1965 to 1975). Searches were repeated and focused with standard techniques.10 We used snowball sampling techniques to search for contextual information on relevant documents with names, project titles (e.g., project CC became Winchester), dates, and adjacent Bates numbers. Our analysis is based on a final collection of approximately 262 research reports, presentations, memorandums, and newspaper articles. To place the documents into their historical and situational context,11 we analyzed themes chronologically and developed a timeline of events (see the box on the next page).
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FINDINGS |
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TOPABSTRACTINTRODUCTIONTOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENT REVIEWFINDINGSRELEVANCE TO CONTEMPORARY...References |
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Background
In the late 1960s, after decades of considerable growth, the cigarette industry was confronted with weak sales12 and identified 3 threats: the health consequences of cigarette smoking highlighted in the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report, a potential broadcast advertising ban, and higher prices.13–15 Cigarette companies considered strategies to combat these threats, and little cigars were uniquely suited to do that for several reasons. Little cigar sales soared after the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report.16–18 Considered "a closer cigarette substitute,"19 they were perceived as safer than cigarettes because cigars were typically not inhaled.17,20 Fearing a cigarette broadcast advertising ban, the industry looked to the United Kingdom, where the 1965 cigarette advertising broadcast ban prompted a drop in cigarette consumption and a rise in cigar consumption.12,13 This was attributed to the "little" cigar or "cigarette-sized" cigar, which was still advertised on television.12,13 Finally, cigarette excise taxes were increasing in the United States. Between 1960 and 1970, state revenue from cigarette taxes increased more than 150% while sales grew by only 10%.21 The little cigar, with its low excise tax, was considerably less expensive than cigarettes.22–24 Thus, the growing interest in little cigars was fueled by low price, implicit health perceptions, and the unlimited use of mass media. RJR, in particular, was determined to exploit these advantages. In October 1968, RJR initiated the development of Winchester, a "cigarettelike cigar" with cigarette taste and mildness (Figure 3
).14
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Product Development
From the beginning, the Winchester little cigar walked a fine line between cigar and cigarette. The project name itself, "project CC," short for cigar/cigarettes, reflected ambiguity.25 Confusion over the product’s identity was found in numerous documents where RJR’s own employees repeatedly referred to project CC as a cigarette.25–29 RJR believed that although the little cigar market was competitive, it remained small because most little cigars were "too strong to allow easy transition for cigarette smokers."12 Early CC blends, which contained cigar tobacco and tobacco commonly found in cigarettes (i.e., flue-cured, burley, and Turkish tobacco), had a mild taste, but RJR desired a still-milder taste with less cigar aroma.29
In September 1970, RJR submitted project CC to the Internal Revenue Service for a ruling on whether CC could be taxed, and subsequently sold, as a little cigar. The blend of this first submission contained 67% cigar tobacco, 20% to 25% flue-cured tobacco, and 5% to 10% Turkish tobacco,30 and the reconstituted tobacco wrapper likely contained primarily cigarette tobacco.30–32 The Internal Revenue Service found the wrapper and filler problematic,33 and the product was reformulated with an all-cigar-tobacco wrapper, removal of flue-cured tobacco from the filler, and an increase of cigar tobacco in the filler (from 67% to 75%). 34 The modified product was resubmitted to the Internal Revenue Service and approved on January 15, 1971.35
Marketing
RJR gave careful consideration toward positioning this product in the market—"Is it a cigar, a cigarette, or somewhere in between?"36 Ultimately, project CC was marketed to cigarette smokers as a cigarette substitute.12,36,37 The initial marketing concept was to position project CC as "the little cigar designed for the cigarette smoker" with an "explicit health claim—satisfaction without inhaling."37 However, this concept was more challenging than anticipated. Focus groups with smokers revealed that the product would probably be inhaled, regardless of promotional messages to the contrary.36 Indeed, initial product testing validated this:
Most men (and women) inhaled their first puffs of this new product. When asked why, they said it was because the product seemed like a cigarette in terms of size and shape and because the filter suggested that it could be smoked just like a cigarette . . . many said they could not imagine giving up inhaling under any circumstances.38
Consumer testing found the product to be "surprisingly mild" and "closer to a cigarette taste," especially when compared with other little cigars on the market.36,38 RJR’s market research showed that the percentage of smokers who identified project CC as a little cigar was "surprisingly low,"39 and many cigarette smokers assumed that the little cigar product, described as "a new kind of smoke" was "another cigarette brand."40
RJR’s key marketing objective was to communicate that although Winchester was not a cigarette, it was similar to cigarettes in many ways.41 Advertising research on the Winchester "Beach" commercial found that the ad successfully utilized several elements to evoke cigarette associations. In addition to the product’s visual similarity to cigarettes, focus group participants for the commercial recalled voiceovers saying, "It’s not a cigar," a woman inhaling the product, and a man reminiscent of the Marlboro cowboy.42 Although RJR executives found the results of the "Beach" focus group encouraging, they wanted more:
The "20 Little Cigars" super at the end of the commercial was in relatively large type and contributed to the recognition that Winchester is a Little Cigar. This type size will be reduced. The fact that the older, slobby man was smoking a big cigar resulted in some smokers thinking that Winchester is for cigar, not cigarette smokers. For this reason other commercials in the pool will probably not show cigars being smoked. In our analysis we will look for additional clues as to how to position Winchester closer to cigarettes.43
In addition to presenting mixed messages about the product, advertising for Winchester intended to "take maximum advantage of access to broadcast media"44 and use price disparity as a promotional tactic targeted to regions where little cigars had a significant price advantage over cigarettes.44,45
"Winchester Is Here"
In August 1971, RJR test marketed Winchester in Boston, Mass, and Dayton, Ohio, which attracted the attention of its competitors, including Brown and Williamson, American Tobacco, and Philip Morris, who quickly initiated product tests.46–48 Analysis by these companies suggested that the Winchester filler contained flue-cured, burley, Turkish, and reconstituted tobacco46–48; the product was less alkaline (i.e., had greater inhalability) than other little cigars46,47; and the wrapper "seems to be more like paper"49 and contained little tobacco,47,48 "at most a few random tobacco fibers."46 Competitors also recognized Winchester’s marketing campaign for what it was: "an all-out effort similar to the way in which cigarette brands—not little cigar brands—have been previously introduced."50 Philip Morris categorized Winchester as a "cheap cigarette" designed to evade cigarette taxes.51
Winchester also garnered considerable attention from journalists, law makers,51,52 and advocates,53,54 who posited that Winchester was developed to circumvent the ban on cigarette advertising on television. RJ Reynolds publicly denied this on numerous occasions: "Obviously, we could not have diabolically designed the product to take advantage of what you term ‘a legalistic loophole,’ which did not then exist and which in our opinion does not now exist."55 However, a 1968 company document clearly identified cigarette advertising restrictions as 1 rationale for this product’s development (Figure 3
).14 The antismoking group Action on Smoking and Health and other advocacy groups were particularly critical of RJR’s tactics to confuse the consumer.53,54 Prompted by a complaint filed by Action on Smoking and Health, the US Department of Justice reached an accord with RJR who agreed to change Winchester packaging (i.e., clear labeling as a little cigar) and point-of-sale marketing (i.e., prevent mixing with cigarettes on counters and in vending machines).56 Although the Department of Justice agreement did not address or restrict RJR’s television advertising of Winchester, Sen Frank Moss (D, Utah) pushed the agenda forward and held hearings that challenged RJR’s right to advertise Winchester on television.57
Little Cigar Council
In response to the Moss hearings, Charles Mouhtouris, a 30-year veteran of the Internal Revenue Service and former Chief of the Tobacco Tax Branch, formed the Little Cigar Council (LCC), a lobbying group that represented several tobacco manufacturers who sold little cigars, in 1972.58 Mouhtouris stated unequivocally during the Moss hearings that "none of our little cigar customers have confused our products with cigarettes, and we have never attempted to cause any such confusion."58 After the Moss hearings, the LCC approached major cigarette manufacturers who also produced little cigars, and RJR joined the LCC board of directors.59 However, American Tobacco was critical of the LCC for ignoring the problems associated with "Reynolds’ cigarette-type advertising of Winchester" and claimed the LCC was nothing more than a "front for RJ Reynolds."60 Interestingly, LCC "dues" were based on market share,61 and so RJR had considerable financial influence with the Council.
Winchester Launches Nationally
Winchester launched nationally in September 1972 and dominated the market (Figure 2). RJ Reynolds was particularly successful in states where the cigarette tax was high and the low price, relative to cigarettes, was exploited at point-of-sale.62,63 However, RJR’s success did not free them from worries; there was considerable concern that existing market advantages (i.e., broadcast advertising and price) were in jeopardy.64
In January 1973, Senator Moss announced intentions to legislatively redefine cigarettes to include little cigars.65 RJ Reynolds management was very concerned: "[I]f we lose the battle with Moss, we will then lose our battles with the states to maintain our tax advantage."66 A month later, under pressure from Senators Magnuson (D, Wash) and Cook (R, Ky), Lorillard and RJR voluntarily withdrew their ads from television.67 Congress later closed the "loophole" by extending the broadcast ban to include little cigars, with the Little Cigar Act of 1973, but did not redefine little cigars as cigarettes.
Did RJR truly lose the broadcast ban battle or was its voluntary withdrawal an offensive maneuver to protect the tax status of its little cigar? Although industry documents are not definitive, certain facts suggest that RJR’s withdrawal was a strategic move to divert attention from the redefinition of little cigars as cigarettes. By 1972, RJR found that, contrary to its fears, the ban on broadcasting tobacco advertisements did not weaken but rather increased cigarette consumption68,69 and, furthermore, weak cigarette sales in the late 1960s "resulted from state taxes rather than the health controversy and the anti-cigarette commercial."70 And so, with respect to its little cigar, RJR notes that the "real cornerstone of this proposition, the one that has really made the brand a success, is Winchester’s ability to beat the high cost of cigarettes."71 Thus, by 1973, RJR was likely much more fearful of higher taxes than of television advertising restrictions for Winchester.
RJ Reynolds’s marketing strategy shifted after the 1973 broadcast ban toward extensive print media targeted to areas with high cigarette taxes.72 At the same time, numerous states introduced legislation that would diminish Winchester’s tax advantage (i.e., taxing or defining little cigars as cigarettes).73 RJ Reynolds actively fought such legislation and was "extremely successful in defeating little cigar taxation which would severely damage Winchester’s business."74 In addition, the LCC actively worked to protect the little cigar’s tax status and retained lobbyists in numerous states to do so.61
Winchester’s Later Years
With the loss of broadcast media for Winchester, RJR executives tried to capitalize on Winchester’s success and strong brand awareness by developing a cigarette spinoff.75 The Winchester cigarette launched in 1974, but without a price advantage, the cigarette did poorly76 and was quickly discontinued. In the late 1970s, little cigar volume declined considerably, and although RJR continued to dominate the market, Winchester’s volume declined faster than the rest of the market.77 The early 1980s were characterized by a boom in the generic and discount cigarette market,78 which likely eroded Winchester’s volume further, and in 1987, RJR sold the Winchester brand to Tobacco Exporter International.
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RELEVANCE TO CONTEMPORARY TOBACCO CONTROL |
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TOPABSTRACTINTRODUCTIONTOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENT REVIEWFINDINGSRELEVANCE TO CONTEMPORARY...References |
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Almost 40 years ago, RJR engaged in a calculated effort to blur the line between cigarettes and little cigars with Winchester, a little cigar designed for cigarette smokers that was as close to cigarettes as legally possible. Although RJR was chiefly motivated by the television broadcast ban during Winchester’s early development, it was the company’s careful consideration of price and tax structure that was the dominant factor in its success. The little cigar boom of the early 1970s was largely attributed to the loophole in the broadcast ban,1 but tax disparities and price played an equal, if not greater, role.
Today there is an overwhelming sense of déjà vu—little cigar sales reached an all-time high in 2006.79 As was the case 40 years ago, there is a marked disparity between cigarette and little cigar excise taxes. Cigarette excise tax increases in numerous states resulted in a doubling of the average tax (includes state and federal) levied on a pack of cigarettes in the United States between fiscal years 2000 and 2006, from $0.65 to $1.31.21 In states with high cigarette excise taxes, a pack of little cigars costs less than half as much as a pack of cigarettes.7 Lower cigar prices are associated with higher rates of cigar use,80 and price disparities may also encourage product switching.81–83 Not surprisingly, little cigar marketing continues to capitalize on tax disparities and cigarette-like characteristics.7 For example, PrimeTime Cigars’s Web site once advertised "so much like cigarettes, it’s hard to believe they are cigars!"84
In addition to having a lower tax rate, little cigars are free from the costs and restrictions imposed on cigarettes by the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) and related legislation (e.g., the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act), not the least of which is that little cigar manufacturers are not required to make MSA or escrow payments to states (estimated at $4.30/carton) as cigarette manufacturers must. Anecdotally, it has been noted by some states that several cigarette manufacturers who failed to make escrow deposits and were subsequently banned from selling cigarettes repackaged their cigarettes as little cigars, circumventing the escrow payment.85 In addition, the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act requires cigarette, but not cigar, manufacturers to disclose ingredients to the Department of Health and Human Services.
Since Winchester broke open the little cigar market some 40 years ago, many little cigar products have been offered to, purchased, and smoked by consumers as a cigarette. Yet, Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Ruling 73–22, which defines tobacco products for taxation, states that an important factor in the determination of the tax status of a product is "whether the product is likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette."86 Although Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Ruling 73–22 has existed for many years, the rapid increase in little cigar consumption and confusion over product classification prompted the TTB to draft a proposed ruling that clarifies statutory definitions for little cigars in early 2006. Subsequently, 40 state attorneys general petitioned the TTB to ensure that the new regulations classify cigarette-like little cigars as cigarettes.85
On October 25, 2006, the TTB released its proposed ruling for public comment. Under the proposed regulations, Winchester and every other "cigarettelike" little cigar would be legally defined as a cigarette.9 The proposed ruling eliminates many of the tax and regulatory conditions that inappropriately benefit manufacturers that sell cigarette-sized little cigars. The public comment period closed on March 26, 2007, and 28 entities, including tobacco manufacturers, tobacco lobbying associations (e.g., Cigar Association of America), and other stakeholders (e.g., distributors, wholesalers), filed official comments on the TTB proposed rule.9 A major theme in many of the comments that oppose the proposed rule was the thesis that the little cigar must be a distinct product simply because the product has existed for more than 40 years. To help validate this viewpoint, the comment filed with the TTB on behalf of Reynolds American Inc cites the history of Winchester, which provides a historical account of selective events that lead up to the Little Cigar Act of 1973 and implies that Congress had earlier "rejected" reclassification of little cigars as cigarettes. However, the previously secret tobacco industry documents reviewed herein provide much more insight and suggest that RJR was highly motivated to avoid such a reclassification and likely maneuvered to protect the little cigar’s crucial tax status by its voluntary withdrawal from television.
In the late 1970s, Winchester little cigars came under fire from politicians, advocates, and regulatory agencies for its cigarette-like design and marketing. Yet the current situation is unchanged from nearly 4 decades ago. The tobacco industry is fighting again to sustain its unique application of federal definitions for certain tobacco products.9 Cigar manufacturers contend that their only aim is to satisfy cigar smokers. However, little cigars have quietly grown in popularity, in no small part because the tobacco industry then and now has knowingly and deliberately marketed the little cigar as a suitable, and more favorably priced, choice for cigarette smokers. Policy approaches, such as the TTB proposed rule,9 are needed to close taxation loopholes87 for the cigarette-like "little cigar."
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Acknowledgments |
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The authors thank Michael Steinberg and M. Jane Lewis for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
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Footnotes |
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Peer Reviewed
Contributions
C. D. Delnevo and M. Hrywna contributed to the essay’s conceptualization, writing, and editing and to the interpretation of tobacco industry documents. C. D. Delnevo searched the tobacco industry document archive and found most of the documents discussed in this essay.
Accepted for publication February 20, 2007.
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References |
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4. Baker F, Ainsworth SR, Dye JT, et al. Health risks associated with cigar smoking. JAMA. 2000;284: 735–740.
5. Nyman AL, Taylor TM, Biener L. Trends in cigar smoking and perceptions of health risks among Massachusetts adults. Tob Control. 2002;11: ii25–ii28.
6. Gilpin EA, Pierce JP. Patterns of cigar use in California in 1999. Am J Prev Med. 2001;21:325–328.[CrossRef][Web of Science][Medline]
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8. Tobacco Outlook. Washington, DC: US Dept of Agriculture, Economic Research Service; 2007:(TBS-262).
9. US Department of Treasury, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, Notice 65. Tax Classification of Cigars and Cigarettes (2006R–276P); Proposed Rule. Available at: http://ttb.gov/tobacco/tobacco_rulemaking.shtml. Accessed May 7, 2007.
10. Malone RE, Balbach ED. Tobacco industry documents: treasure trove or quagmire? Tob Control. 2000;9: 334–338.
11. Bero L. Implications of the tobacco industry documents for public health and policy. Annu Rev Public Health. 2003;24:267–288.[CrossRef][Web of Science][Medline]
12. RJ Reynolds. Product C/C marketing plan. General background data. 1970. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500758026/8031. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mlk69d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
13. Unknown. Attached is the completed report you requested on construction trends in the United Kingdom. July 5, 1968. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500575492/5502. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rwg76a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
14. Stewart BR. Provisional planning proposal. CC. October 8, 1968. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501516765. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ydv39d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
15. Christopher HE. Summary. New plans for 1970–1974 (700000–740000). Staff up Sales Promotion Dept. September 15, 1969. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501516744/6747. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/uth23a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
16. Macvey NG/X. Report on little cigars. February 6, 1964. Brown and Williamson. Bates no. 779239970/9971. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/uau21c00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
17. The market for little cigars. Marketing report. May 1964. Brown and Williamson. Bates no. 779239937/9958. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ssb10f00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
18. Hammer AR, New York Times. Cigarette report aids cigar sales. January 11, 1964. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500517571. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zdi79d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
19. Product profile: cigar. January 14, 1969. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501161993/2008. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/gmz49d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
20. Lincoln J. White cigar. Memorandum. May 28, 1963. Philip Morris. Bates no. 1000827573. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rzr54e00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
21. Orzechowski W, Walker RC. The Tax Burden on Tobacco. Vol. 40. Arlington, Va: Orzechowski & Walker; 2005.
22. Summary. New plans for 1970–1974 (700000–740000). 1974. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501516768/6786. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/enx66a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
23. Harwood EH, Senkus M, Teague CE Jr, et al. Annual research and development project review. Sedgefield Country Club. January 19–22, 1970 (700119–700122). Detailed minutes of presentations and discussions. January 22, 1970. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 504802452/2478. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/enn55d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
24. Swetonic DN. Tax structure—cigarettes, little cigars & large cigars (including cigarillos). March 2, 1970. Philip Morris. Bates no. 1000291452/1454. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tnq84e00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
25. Jones SO, Tobacco products development. Monthly product development report. Tobacco products development, 1969 (690000), no. 5. June 5, 1969. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500980499/0511. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/aok59d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
26. Cundiff RH. Meeting with marketing department personnel, January 3, 1969 (690103). January 6, 1968. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500980378/0382. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/quw85a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
27. Green CR, Schumacher JN. Smoke composition: cigar blend cigarettes with dyed and undyed overwraps. (Project 2384: CC). May 20, 1971. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501545060/5068. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/yxr39d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
28. Cundiff RH. Monthly report-blends and filter development section October 1, 1969 – October 31, 1969. (691001–691031). November 10, 1969. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 504699366/9375. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vfv45a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
29. Stewart BR. Monthly product development review. March 12, 1969 (690312). March 12, 1969. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 504699489/9491. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rux55d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
30. Fitzgerald CW Jr. Analysis of Philip Morris little cigar. November 17, 1970. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500678067. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wwy85a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
31. Crohn MH Jr. This is in response to your undated letter attaching additional questions for the record that was received by us on February 25, 1972. March 29, 1972. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500060760/0763. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cec99d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
32. Fitzgerald CW. Proposed specifications for improving C/C prototype product. December 31, 1970. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500350262. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qsw79d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
33. Fitzgerald CW Jr. Project C/C status report. November 1970 (701100). October 28, 1970. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500350651/0652. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rpb95a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
34. Fitzgerald CW Jr. Proposed specifications for improving C/C prototype Product. January 5, 1971. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500350250/0251. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/psw79d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
35. Jones SO. Tobacco development weekly report January 11–15, 1971 (710111) – (710115). January 15, 1971. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 504179811/9813. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/oxs58d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
36. RJ Reynolds. Consumer research report. Little cigar group discussion. June 26, 1969. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501141167/1169. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wwa59d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
37. Odear RM Jr, Sherrill JH Jr. Project CC research. Letter. August 12, 1969. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501141162/1163. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vwa59d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
38. ES, Dancer Fitzgerald. Exploratory F. G. I. study of product "CC" concept. December 16, 1969. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500765043/5053. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xgk69d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
39. Galyan PE, Marketing Research Dept. C/C product category identification. (MRD#06–208). Letter. November 3, 1970. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500350645. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jtw79d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
40. Dancer Fitzgerald. Pilot study of CC concepts. June 9, 1970. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501141130/1152. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/twa59d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
41. Objectives. Marketing research. February 17, 1971. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500765068. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zgk69d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
42. RJ Reynolds. Advertising research report. C/C "Beach" :60 group discussions. November 8, 1971. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 502423930/3950. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xka19d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
43. Harlow GE, Marketing Research Dept. Field trip to observe C/C "Beach":60 group discussions (MRD # 71-0105). Letter. May 24, 1971. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500482599. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/sol79d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
44. Product C/C promotion strategy. February 24, 1970. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500758070/8074. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/nlk69d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
45. I CWF, Dancer Fitzgerald. Product C/C introductory media plan. Supplementary broadcast markets. June 15, 1971. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500350682. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ltw79d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
46. Hager JH. Winchester little cigars. Memo. September 17, 1971. American Tobacco. Bates no. 966014129/4131. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hvo60a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
47. Nall J, Brown and Williamson. Winchester small cigars. Memo. September 23, 1971. Brown and Williamson. Bates no. 670857736/7739. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ork60f00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
48. Wickham JE. Winchester little cigar - Reynolds Tobacco Company. Memo. September 1, 1971. Philip Morris. Bates no. 1000720178. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iyj08e00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
49. Bernstein A, American Cigar. No title. Memo. August 18, 1971. American Tobacco. Bates no. 950134510. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/sfk31a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
50. Cigarette industry new products review. Speech. October 21, 1971. Brown and Williamson. Bates no. 670173531/3562. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lmx50f00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
51. Public relations study for Philip Morris Incorporated. November 1972. Philip Morris. Bates no. 1002420724/0842. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/slv28e00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
52. Wilson BB, Dept of Justice. Testimony of Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, concerning the need for amendments to the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, before the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee—February 10 1972 (720210). February 10, 1972. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500080334/0344. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hsz89d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
53. Action on Smoking and Health. Violation of cigarette advertising ban charged. Report. October 1, 1971. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500080214/0215. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rzd95a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
54. Purdon RA, Council of Better Business Bureaus. Winchester little cigars. Letter. February 18, 1972. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500060782. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dec99d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
55. Stewart BR. The statements contained in your editorial of Jan. 1 which implied that Winchester is in some way harming the advertising trade by serving as "the cigarette’s version of reminder advertising" are unfair and totally unfounded. Letter. January 1, 1973. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500060689/0690. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/sdc99d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
56. US Department of Justice. Release from Department of Justice 720118. January 18, 1972. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500080266/0267. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bsz89d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
57. Moss FE. Statement of Senator Frank E. Moss, D-Utah. Consumer Subcommittee. February 10, 1972 (720210). February 10, 1972. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500080146/0147. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wzd95a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
58. Mouhtouris CJ, Little Cigar Council. Statement of Charles J. Mouhtouris Secretary-Treasurer, Little Cigar Council to the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee. February 10, 1972. Philip Morris. Bates no. 1005111335/1343. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vzd54e00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
59. Little Cigar Council Inc, Board of Directors. List. January 10, 1973. American Tobacco. Bates no. 966034582. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lgw60a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
60. Heimann RK, American Brands Inc. No title. Memo. January 15, 1973. American Tobacco. Bates no. 966034576. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iqq51a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
61. Coffey GJ, American Cigar. Little Cigar Council. Memo. January 12, 1973. American Tobacco. Bates no. 966034577/4581. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kgw60a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
62. Harlow GE, Marketing Research Dept. Marketing inputs for the January, 1973 (730100) company forecast (MRD# 73 0019). Letter. January 10, 1973. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501388133/8134. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/gtg49d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
63. Weinman A. Competitive promotional activity report - 720900. October 31, 1972. Philip Morris. Bates no. 2049307117/7127. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/deg58d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
64. Unknown. Statement of business. Marketing plan. September 8, 1972. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500758277/8280. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/exx85a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
65. Moss to introduce legislation to amend the Federal Cigarette and Labeling Advertising Act. Press release. January 4, 1973. Philip Morris. Bates no. 2042468263/8264. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hda93e00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
66. Groat BR. January 3 management meeting on Winchester. Minutes. January 10, 1973. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501140954/0956. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jwa59d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
67. Legislative Bulletin, TMER, Tobacco Merchants Association. Legislative Bulletin two companies withdraw broadcast ads for little cigars, Sens. Magnuson, Cook hail step. February 27, 1973. Lorillard. Bates no. 89096761/6764. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/gav98c00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
68. Louisville Times. Ban became boon cigarette sales, profits soared after TV ads ended. July 17, 1972. Brown and Williamson. Bates no. 680108285. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fxw11c00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
69. Wade CB Jr. Greensboro panel remarks. Speech. January 13, 1972. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500006163/6181. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/uni99d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
70. Marketing research presentation. 1973. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501725464/5473. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/upm77c00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
71. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company. Personnel information. June 30, 1972. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501815975/6023. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/oit66a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
72. Marketing plan. January 1, 1973. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500350453/0459. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/atw79d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
73. Harlow GE, Marketing Research Dept. Winchester - June, 1973 (730600) sales forecast (MRD #73-0019). June 13, 1973. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501388097/8098. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ctg49d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
74. Dancer Fitzgerald. 1974 (740000) Winchester annual marketing plan. 1974. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 500738549/8589. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jvl69d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
75. Hall LW Jr. New cigarette idea. Letter. December 4, 1972. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501080470. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rgg59d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
76. Murphy J. Winchester test mkt. eval. May 6, 1975. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 501874988/4999. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/pvs66a00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
77. Little cigars/Winchester. Key problems/opportunities. 1979. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 502301035/1052. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/osw61d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
78. Action alternatives in a price sensitive market. Management summary. 1983. RJ Reynolds. Bates no. 505250252/0266. Available at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eop25d00. Accessed February 17, 2007.
79. US Department of Treasury, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Trade Bureau. 2006 Tobacco Products Monthly Statistical Releases. Available at: http://www.ttb.gov/statistics/06tobstats.shtml. Accessed February 1, 2007.
80. Ringel JS, Wasserman J, Andreyeva T. Effects of public policy on adolescents’ cigar use: evidence from the National Youth Tobacco Survey. Am J Public Health. 2005;95:995–998.
81. Delnevo CD, Hrywna M, Foulds J, Steinberg MB. Cigar use before and after a cigarette excise tax increase in New Jersey. Addict Behav. 2004;29: 1799–1807.[CrossRef][Web of Science][Medline]
82. Ohsfeldt RL, Boyle RG, Capilouto E. Effects of tobacco excise taxes on the use of smokeless tobacco products in the USA. Health Econ. 1997;6: 525–531.[CrossRef][Web of Science][Medline]
83. Delnevo CD, Foulds J, Hrywna M. Trading tobacco: are youths choosing cigars over cigarettes? Am J Public Health. 2005;95:2123.
84. PrimeTime Cigars [Web site]. Available at: http://web.archive.org/web/20040722134827/ http://www.primetimecigars.com/index.html. Accessed February 17, 2007.
85. National Association of Attorneys General. Petition for Rule Making; May 2006. Available at: http://www.naag.org/news/pdf/20060519.FinalPetitionToTTBReLittleCigars.pdf. Accessed February 17, 2007.
86. US Dept of Treasury, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Trade Bureau. ATF Ruling 73–22; 2006. Available at: http://www.ttb.gov/rulings/73-22.htm. Accessed July 31, 2006.
87. Laugesen M, Scollo M, Sweanor D, et al. World’s best practice in tobacco control. Tob Control. 2000;9:228–236.
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