Efforts to recruit allies and supporters were increasingly successful (Table 1 and the box on pages 1194–1195). By 1997, 3 state governors and 4 state attorneys general had expressed formal support for We Card.^68,69 We Card coalitions, consisting primarily of retailers, retail trade groups, restaurants, alcohol industry groups, and petroleum marketers, were created in 21 states,^64,70 and the Junior Chamber of Commerce agreed to distribute We Card kits.^71–74 CRTR used billboard space donated by outdoor advertising companies for public service announcements to promote We Card in 11 states.^64,75–78 Press coverage was extensive and favorable.^{66, 79–95} Coalition press releases noted that law enforcement agencies endorsed the program and that police officers were distributing We Card materials to retailers.^96–98 We Card was heavily promoted as a way to meet the requirements of the Synar Regulation,⁹⁹ which required states to enforce laws prohibiting tobacco sales to minors. The Tobacco Institute reported that “the FDA [Food and Drug Administration] has come to We Card for help in educating retailers.”¹⁰⁰

TABLE 1 Government Organizations’ Involvement With We Card: United States, 1996–1999

We Card Members and Participants: United States, 1996–1999

We Card Members and Participants: United States, 1996–1999

Coalition members

American Wholesale Marketers Association

Food Marketing Institute

Lorillard Tobacco Company

NACS, the Association for Convenience and Petroleum Retailing

National Grocers Association

Philip Morris USA

RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company

Supporting members

American Beverage Licensees

Beck Suppliers, Inc

BI-LO

Chevron Texaco

Commonwealth Brands, Inc

Conwood Company, LLC

Cumberland Farms

ExxonMobil

John Middleton

National Association of Chain Drug Stores

National Association of Police Organizations

National Association of Tobacco Outlets

National Black Police Association

National Korean American Grocers Association

National Retail Federation

NATSO, Inc

Penn National Gaming, Inc

Petroleum Marketers Association of American

Retail Industry Leaders Association

Service Station Dealers of America and Allied Trades

Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America

Team Schierl Companies

United Refining Company

US Smokeless Tobacco Company

Shared voluntary compliance agreements

BP West Coast Products

Chevron

ConocoPhillips

CVS

ExxonMobil

Kroger

Rite-Aid

Safeway

7-Eleven

Shell

Walgreens

Wal-Mart

On-site trainings (incomplete list)

Circle K

Cumberland Farms

CVS Pharmacy

Dairy Barn

Duane Reade

Flying J

Golden Gallon

Kmart

Kum-N-Go

Lucky Stores

Mobil

Motiva

Murphy Oil

Pak-A-Sak

Safeway

Shop Rite Food Stores

Sugar Creek Stores

Sunoco

Texaco

The Pantry Stores

TOPS Markets

Trimart

Wawa

Xtramart

Note. We Card is a “youth smoking prevention” program created by the Tobacco Institute, the US tobacco industry's lobbying organization. This table is adapted from the We Card Web site¹ and an internal Coalition for Responsible Tobacco Retailing document.⁶⁷

By 1998, CRTR had created seminars targeting state public health departments, and the coalition claimed that 18 state agencies supported We Card, some specifically as a means of achieving Synar compliance.¹⁰¹ State public health, tobacco control, and alcohol control agencies; law enforcement groups; and local police and health departments recruited retailers for training, promoted We Card, attended training sessions, and distributed We Card materials, as shown in Table 1.^66,101,102 CRTR also recruited additional elected officials to support the program, now totaling 9 governors and 5 attorneys general,⁶⁹ and claimed to have trained 24 000 retailers and distributed 530 000 kits.^103–106 Billboard public service announcements expanded to nearly 1500 placements,¹⁰⁷ coalitions supporting the program encompassed 40 states,⁴⁸ and press releases announced celebrations of “We Card day.”¹⁰⁸

Under the terms of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, the Tobacco Institute was dissolved in 1999, and CRTR and the We Card program were reconstituted by individual companies.^35,109 As part of this reorganization and in response to Master Settlement Agreement costs, We Card's budget was cut to $3.4 million,^48,110,111 its newsletter was cancelled, and efforts began to enlist others to cover the program's costs.¹¹² One idea was to pass the program and its costs to the tobacco control foundation newly created by the Master Settlement Agreement, which eventually was named the American Legacy Foundation.¹¹³ CRTR proposed to “Reach out to non-traditional allies—offer [the] American Legacy Foundation [and] state training programs an opportunity to participate.”¹¹⁴ Ultimately, it appears that the American Legacy Foundation was not contacted and would not have agreed to sponsor the program (C. Healton, president and chief executive officer, American Legacy Foundation, personal communication, May 23, 2009), despite CRTR's goal to turn We Card into “a public-private ‘community’ training and education program.”¹¹⁵

With its reduced budget, in 1999 CRTR aimed to “specify various promotional programs and efforts to include public official participation” and “increase media appeal,” including continued use of public service announcements^48,116 and other media.^117,118 CRTR continued recruiting endorsements,^119–122 but there were increasing demands to show that the program was actually effective. Although CRTR claimed that “evidence of We Card's effectiveness has been reported in 5 states,”^123,124 this evidence was weak, consisting of 2 testimonials, 1 study of requests to provide IDs with no sample size disclosed, 1 survey of retailer knowledge, and a comparison of violations discovered between 1996 and 1997.¹²⁵ As a result, the Coalition noted a new program goal: “document [an] incontrovertible case that active participation in We Card training and education reduces underage tobacco sales at the retail counter.”⁴⁸ However, the metrics presented by CRTR continued to focus on the number of training sessions, kits, billboards, and endorsements, as well as the extent of press coverage, and the coalition touted the fact that 24 state agencies now promoted the program.^{121,123,124,126–137} Tobacco companies were advertising We Card on corporate Web sites,¹³⁸ and some retail chains mandated its use in all stores.¹³⁹ Despite continued concerns regarding the program's effectiveness, CRTR concluded that We Card training provided “evidence that further restrictions and taxes aren't necessary.”⁴²

The most notable change to We Card in the 21st century was the shift of many program costs to retailers. However, questions about effectiveness continued: in 2001, a newspaper columnist reported that multiple stores displaying We Card materials did not card him when he attempted to buy tobacco on his 18th birthday.¹⁴⁰ Another article noted that the majority of clerks who sold to minors had asked for and received IDs showing purchasers were underage,¹⁴¹ a finding consistent with research on the effectiveness of compliance checks.⁴⁷ Moreover, a 2003 Philip Morris report cited research showing that only 19% of cigarettes obtained by youths were from retail stores,^142,143 undercutting the rationale for the We Card program. However, CRTR continued its publicity throughout 2000 to 2002, claiming the program was stronger than existing laws in 2000,¹⁴⁴ despite the fact that enforcement consisted of writing letters to retailers—and, in the worst case, imposing a short-term suspension of promotional programs.^145–149 Updates on alliances continued.^150–159 CRTR also developed materials in new languages (Spanish, Korean), drew up agreements with new companies to support the program, and sent We Card materials to congressional hearings in an effort to prevent the passage of new tobacco restrictions.^160–162

In 2004, the shift of many We Card materials’ costs to retailers was complete.^163–165 We Card materials had been fully integrated into brand promotions and advertising displays to convey the message of manufacturer responsibility, and retailers could not participate in incentive programs (industry payments to retailers for tobacco promotions in stores) unless they received training and purchased and displayed multiple We Card items.^166–170 Partly as a result, program advertisements in 2006 were able to claim that “more than 82 000 retailers have been trained in We Card seminars … about the importance of selling tobacco products only to those of legal age.”¹⁷¹ In 2009, CRTR advertised that it had distributed more than 1 million kits and had secured support from state agencies in 25 of 50 states.¹

The history of the We Card program reveals increasing incongruity between the stated aims of the program and its actual activities. According to CRTR, “In 1995, a group of like-minded organizations got together to discuss what they could accomplish as a team to prevent the underage sale of tobacco. The answer became abundantly clear: training and education.”¹ However, the coalition's activities for more than a decade focused primarily on handing out materials, without any effort to determine whether they changed behavior; collecting endorsements; publicizing We Card; and praising the program's sponsors.

This pattern reflects the tobacco industry's concern with its public image. One executive noted, “In most cases, we [tobacco companies] don't want broad media coverage. The ‘general’ press coverage of cigarettes and cigarette manufacturers is almost always negative.”¹⁷² Both CRTR and the We Card program were presented as quasi-independent entities that happened to enjoy tobacco industry support, rather than as the almost wholly owned industry subsidiaries they were. When CRTR's director was asked to provide information on We Card funding to a tobacco company government relations representative, he responded, “On the funding question, we both know that the bulk of the funding is provided by TI [the Tobacco Institute]. That's not something that I advertise, nor discuss with anyone outside of the manufacturers and TI. The CRTR board knows it … but I'm reluctant to put that in writing for distribution” [ellipsis in original].³⁴

In internal documents passed between CRTR and tobacco companies, those involved with the program were more specific about We Card's underlying goals, which were 2-fold: first, to improve the industry's image through publicity, and second, to reduce regulation and law enforcement activity focused on tobacco control, particularly stings of retail outlets that revealed the extent of sales to minors.

Improve tobacco's image by publicizing We Card. The chronology of the We Card program reveals CRTR's heavy emphasis on publicity and alliances. Promotional materials proclaimed that We Card was “a national success.”¹⁷³ Discussion of what that meant to the companies sponsoring the program appears in reports about advertising tests run by Philip Morris in 2000, which compared tobacco control advertising with industry advertising campaigns, including those that publicized We Card:

Focus group testing with the general public, smokers, and opinion leaders in 2003 demonstrated We Card's continuing success in promoting the tobacco industry's image.¹⁷⁷ Advertisements for We Card were the most commonly recalled tobacco industry promotional materials, and reviews of the program within Philip Morris explicitly stated that We Card was a form of corporate advertising.¹⁷⁸ Promotion of We Card improved the company's reputation,¹⁷⁹ even though research on youths at risk for tobacco use suggested that they perceived We Card advertisements as encouragement to smoke upon turning 18 (J. Moon-Howard, DrPH, personal communication, June 2009). Over time, Philip Morris proved unable to maintain positive public perceptions of its corporate responsibility program, but positive perceptions of the company's commitment to youth smoking prevention remained.¹⁸⁰

Reduce tobacco regulation and the enforcement of existing tobacco control laws. The tobacco industry and retailers anticipated from the program's inception that We Card could be used to block stronger policies restricting youth access to tobacco. Industry surveys in 1996 found that retailers saw this as an excellent use of the program.¹⁸¹ However, FDA regulators attempting to improve Synar compliance noted that retailers had no serious interest in using We Card to actually reduce tobacco sales to minors. One complained: “As far as We Card goes, there's trouble with just placing signs and nothing more. Retailers think they've met their responsibility as soon as they post the signs.”¹⁸² Similarly, Tobacco Institute lobbyists viewed the program as primarily political, noting in a 1997 report: “Once again, work by the WE CARD Coalition has been instrumental in state efforts to enact reasonable youth access laws.”¹⁰⁰ As an example of “reasonable” laws, the memo praised state laws preempting stronger local legislation.¹⁰⁰

Efforts to use We Card to reduce law enforcement activities were more covert, initially detailed in a confidential 1996 CRTR document that surveyed We Card retailers and made suggestions for program users based on tactics found effective for others.⁴³ It expressed strong concern about auditing of retail outlets (meaning stings wherein law enforcement agencies sent minors to stores to attempt tobacco purchases) and suggested that promoting We Card could reduce this practice. The report suggested that the tobacco and retail industry could use We Card to “[sensitize] cops, who don't always understand how difficult it is for clerks to card customers.”⁴³ It highlighted efforts to use We Card to reduce law enforcement activity indirectly by providing positive publicity. As an example, the report noted:

The Coalition later successfully solicited multiple police departments to participate in the “It's Our Duty” program, in which police officers distributed We Card promotions to retailers.^96–98,183

By 1999, CRTR had developed enough positive publicity that it could use its contacts to advocate against tobacco control policies, insulating tobacco companies from the negative press coverage it feared when it acted alone. In its 1999 training and education plan, the coalition explained:

Soon, however, efforts to promote We Card as an alternative to other regulation began to draw negative attention. California had passed the Stop Tobacco Access to Kids Enforcement (STAKE) Act in 1995, which required that retailers post a notice including a telephone number to report to the state failures to check identification for tobacco purchases (Figure 1 shows a copy of the official STAKE notice). In 2003, the California attorney general's office threatened litigation against CRTR for encouraging retailers to violate state law through its promotion of We Card instead of STAKE notices. The office's first letter explained:

The issues raised by the attorney general suggested larger problems with We Card that would continue to be an issue in other states.^185–188 These included the revelation that We Card materials stated that facsimiles of official identification were acceptable proof of legal age for tobacco sales, which the California attorney general viewed as problematic: “Facsimiles or reasonable likenesses of IDs should be viewed by the Coalition and by retailers as being inherently untrustworthy. Reliance on such documents should not be promoted in the Coalition's website and materials.”¹⁸⁷

Although CRTR changed its materials to comply with California law, We Card has continued to dominate the California retail environment. A state report noted, “More stores carried ‘We Card’ signs, distributed by the tobacco industry, than the State mandated Stop Tobacco Access to Kids Enforcement (STAKE) Act signs.”¹⁸⁹ In 2008, only half of retailers complied with the STAKE Act, whereas three quarters displayed We Card signs. Since 2001, use of We Card materials by retailers has dramatically exceeded use of STAKE materials in every year (Figure 2). Despite the efforts of California agencies, We Card has continued to undermine compliance with state laws.

FIGURE 2 Prevalence of tobacco industry age-of-sale warning signs versus state-required age-of-sale warning signs: California retailers, 1998–2008.

Note. STAKE = Stop Tobacco Access to Kids Enforcement. The definition of a STAKE Act sign changed in 2006 to include non–California Department of Public Health signs that still met the legal requirements. Source. From the Youth Tobacco Purchase Survey, 1998–2008, California Department of Public Health, California Tobacco Control Program, July 2008.¹⁹⁰