Persons under certain domestic violence restraining orders are prohibited by federal law from purchasing and possessing a firearm. We used administrative data from California to link 794426 restraining orders with 1388724 handgun purchase applications. We found that restrained persons were not a less law-abiding group in general, but they appeared to be repeatedly or serially abusive to intimate partners, and their handgun purchase rates were highest after their restraining orders expired.

Intimate partner violence results in nearly 2 million injuries and more than 1500 deaths annually in the United States.1,2 Firearms figure prominently in these assaults: households in which intimate partner violence has occurred may be more likely to contain a handgun than households without incidents of violence,3 intimate partner assaults involving a firearm are 12 times more likely to result in death than those involving other weapons or bodily force,4 firearms are the most common weapon in intimate partner homicides,1 and for women, intimate partner violence is more likely than violence by strangers to result in injuries and deaths.5

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act prohibits the purchase and possession of firearms by persons under certain domestic violence restraining orders.6 (A restraining order, also called a protective or stay-away order, is a court order that limits one person’s behavior to protect another.) A recent ecological study documented a 7% reduction in intimate partner homicides in states with domestic violence restraining order firearm prohibitions.7 However, the study did not assess how well the laws were implemented and enforced, so the full effect of the law may not have been evident.

We examined the history of firearm purchase by individuals under a restraining order and assessed whether existing purchase and possession prohibitions kept firearms out of the hands of batterers.

Data came from 2 statewide databases of the California Department of Justice. The Domestic Violence Restraining Order System is a computerized database of all restraining orders issued in California. Established in 1991, the database’s primary purpose is to allow law enforcement to determine whether a person who applies to purchase a firearm is under a restraining order; multiple types of restraining orders (temporary, emergency, etc.) are included. All system records from May 2003 through November 2005 were obtained.

The Dealer’s Record of Sale is the log of all handgun purchase applications (including private-party transfers). It does not indicate whether each application resulted in a sale; thus, it serves as a proxy for purchases and intent to purchase from a legal source. Because almost half of handguns have been acquired in the previous 5 years,8 approximately half of traced firearms were purchased in the previous 6 years,9 and the restraining order data began in 2003, we used records from 1998 to 2005.

We linked the 794 426 records from the Domestic Violence Restraining Order System with the 1 388 724 Dealer’s Record of Sale files. We calculated descriptive statistics to examine 5 previously unaddressed research questions: how many handguns should have been relinquished? How did handgun purchases of restrained persons compare with those of the general population? Were restrained persons prevented from purchasing a handgun, as the law intends? What was the basis for denying handgun purchase applications of restrained persons? Did patterns of handgun purchase change when restraining orders expired? Because we used population data, statistical tests associated with samples are not indicated.

As shown in Table 1, 9694 persons applied to purchase 17 720 handguns between 1998 and 2005 before coming under a restraining order during a 31-month period in 2003 to 2005; 95% of the applications were approved. We estimated, on the basis of previous research about firearm purchases8 and our own results, that approximately 80 000 legally purchased guns should have been relinquished by Californians who came under a restraining order during the study period. Some unknown portion of the guns likely were sold, given away, stolen, or otherwise no longer in the buyer’s possession, and guns obtained illegally were not taken into account; thus, the estimate should be viewed solely as an approximation.

The handgun purchase patterns of restrained persons before they received a restraining order closely resembled those of the general California population. In each group, nearly two thirds applied to buy 1 handgun, 30% applied to purchase 2 to 5, and 4% to 5% applied for 6 or more. Currently and previously restrained persons applied to purchase fewer handguns than did the other 2 groups.

We calculated person-time at risk and found that the rates at which individuals applied and were approved to purchase a handgun were highest for California residents overall, followed by formerly restrained persons, persons who became restrained, and those currently under a restraining order (Table 2).

Denial rates were higher among those who were under a restraining order at some point in the study period. Denials were highest for currently restrained persons, suggesting that a substantial proportion are prohibited from acquiring handguns legally. Restrained persons, compared with the general population, had a higher proportion of denials because of misdemeanors and other restraining orders and a lower proportion because of felony convictions and the state law restricting handgun purchase to 1 per month (data not shown).

Persons under a restraining order were less likely than were others to apply to purchase a handgun. They may have been aware that they were legally prohibited from doing so; the prohibition is clearly stated on the restraining order itself. Nonetheless, nearly half of the purchase applications they filed were approved after a background check. This system shortcoming may have been related to a lack of procedural specificity, a problem that may be ameliorated through recent legislation that specified the court as the party responsible for entering restraining order information into the database within 1 business day.13

Our findings suggest that restrained persons were not a less law-abiding group in general than the overall population of handgun buyers, but a pattern of multiple restraining orders indicated that they repeatedly abused the same or a series of intimate partners. Persons who came under a restraining order were more likely to apply to purchase a handgun after their restraining order expired than before it was issued, but their motivation could not be ascertained in our data. Moreover, although a substantial number of firearms should be relinquished by persons who come under a restraining order (approximately 2600/mo in the state we studied), anecdotal reports suggest that few are turned in.1416

Our preliminary work suggested that only 7.9% (n = 23) of victims of intimate partner homicide (1.8% of male victims and 9.5% of female victims) in California in 2004 were protected by a restraining order at the time they were killed. An additional 1.7% of female intimate partner homicide victims had an expired restraining order (data not shown). A firearm was used to kill 48.1% of those without an active restraining order, 43.5% of those with an active restraining order, and 50.0% of those with an expired restraining order. Apparently at least some portion of restrained persons continued to have guns and to use them against their partners.

The ability of domestic violence restraining orders to prevent gun-related threats and assaults rests almost entirely in the implementation and enforcement of and compliance with the associated firearm purchase and possession prohibitions. State laws are required, and many states have yet to pass enabling legislation.7,14 The passage of legislation to ensure that federal law more fully reaches its potential to reduce gun-related threats and fatal and nonfatal injuries by intimate partners is urgently needed.

But legislation is not enough. California has some of the most stringent gun laws in the nation, but a lack of political will, resource limitations, and a lack of awareness about the gravity of domestic violence prevent adequate implementation and enforcement of firearm restrictions related to domestic violence.15 These barriers are not unique to 1 state,16,17 nor are they insurmountable: for example, although their systems are imperfect, law enforcement agencies impound vehicles and seize and store illegal drugs; with adequate resources, similar systems could be instituted to seize, receive, and store the guns of persons under restraining orders. Practices that may improve compliance yet do not require substantial resources have been identified.15,18 In particular, ongoing monitoring of relevant databases is important, as is careful thought about how to ensure that firearms are relinquished by or removed from batterers.

Table
TABLE 1— Handgun Applications During 1998–2005 From California Residents Overall and Those Who Came Under a Restraining Order During 2003–2005
TABLE 1— Handgun Applications During 1998–2005 From California Residents Overall and Those Who Came Under a Restraining Order During 2003–2005
  Restrained Persons
 California ResidentsTotalaBefore Restraining OrderWhile Restraining Order in EffectAfter Restraining Order Expiration
Total handgun applications, No. Handgun applications per person, No. (%)673 40911 1069 6949291 826
    1434 405 (64.5)7 060 (63.6)6 411 (66.1)727 (78.3)1 296 (71.0)
    2119 964 (17.8)2 147 (19.3)1 790 (18.5)114 (12.3)308 (16.9)
    347 746 (7.1)849 (7.6)683 (7.1)44 (4.7)114 (6.2)
    423 709 (3.5)393 (3.5)396 (3.2)21 (2.3)38 (2.1)
    513 167 (2.0)198 (1.8)147 (1.5)7 (0.8)29 (1.6)
    68 539 (1.3)121 (1.1)92 (1.0)7 (0.8)16 (0.9)
    75 537 (0.8)81 (0.7)65 (0.7)4 (0.4)6 (0.3)
    83 930 (0.6)58 (0.5)46 (0.5)2 (0.2)6 (0.3)
    92 812 (0.4)28 (0.3)23 (0.2)2 (0.2)2 (0.1)
    102 170 (0.3)31 (0.3)25 (0.3)0 (0)2 (0.1)
    ≥1111 430b (0.8)140c (1.3)106c (1.1)1d (0.1)9e (0.5)
Handguns, total, No.1 388 72421 20617 7201 3232 896
Handguns, mean2.061.911.831.421.59

Note. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding error.

aThe number of restrained persons totals to less than the sum of the before, during, and after groups because some restrained persons purchased a handgun more than once.

bRange: 11–575.

cRange: 11–54.

dThis person applied to purchase 13 handguns while under a restraining order.

eRange: 11–23.

Table
TABLE 2— Annual Average (per 100 000 Residents per Year) of California Residents Who Applied to Purchase a Handgun, by Restraining Order Status: 1998–2005
TABLE 2— Annual Average (per 100 000 Residents per Year) of California Residents Who Applied to Purchase a Handgun, by Restraining Order Status: 1998–2005
 Applications for Handgun PurchaseApprovals
Restrained persons, May 2003–November 2005
    Before restraining order (n = 373 666)396358
    While restraining order was in effect (n = 464 958)12449
    After restraining order expiration (n = 328 332)451380
California residents (n = 24 014 267)503496

Source. Data are from the State of California, Department of Finance.11,12

Note. Rates take into account each individual’s time at risk (i.e., time during which they could file an application to purchase a handgun) and account for persons with multiple restraining orders. In addition, rates are for persons 21 years or older, because 21 is the youngest age for legal handgun purchase in California.10

We are grateful to the Joyce Foundation for funding this work and the California Department of Justice for making these data available.

Preliminary findings from the study were presented at the 134th Annual Meeting of the American Public Health Association; November 6–8, 2006; Boston, Mass.

We thank Haikang Shen and Vivian Lew for their help with data preparation, Geoffrey Barnes for his help with data linkage, and Manisha Joshi for her help with cleaning the data.

For the interested reader, a more-detailed version of this brief is available from the authors.

Human Participants Protection The University of Pennsylvania Social and Behavioral Sciences institutional review board reviewed and approved this study.

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Katherine A. Vittes, PhD, and Susan B. Sorenson, PhDAt the time of the study, Katherine A. Vittes was with the School of Social Policy and Practice, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Susan B. Sorenson is with the School of Social Policy and Practice and the Department of Criminology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. “Keeping Guns Out of the Hands of Abusers: Handgun Purchases and Restraining Orders”, American Journal of Public Health 98, no. 5 (May 1, 2008): pp. 828-831.

https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2007.124115

PMID: 18381985